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Abstract We study a stylized model of High Frequency Trading in which traders
equipped with private values and costs operate in a Continuous Double Auction.
They can revise their orders with different frequencies and, hence, (only) some
agents can repeatedly revise and resubmit orders in the same session, mimicking
the behaviour of high frequency traders. All agents attempt to maximize profits,
learning which bid and ask is to be posted in a given configuration of the book. We
analyze the efficiency of the resulting market and the way the surplus from trading
is apportioned among agents as a function of the number and type of high frequency
traders. We find that the presence of a small proportion of high frequency traders in-
creases the overall efficiency of the market; secondly, the ones who have the chance
to frequently revise the offers learn to extract a disproportionate fraction of the prof-
its that ordinarily would belong to slow traders.
1 Introduction
High Frequency Trading (HFT) broadly refers to trading strategies involving fast
submission, cancelation and revision of orders in a Continuous Double Auction
(CDA). Often, a massive number of orders is submitted to be left on the book for
very short times and it is estimated that more than 50% of daily stocks are exchanged
by HFT financial firms. There is anecdotal evidence that such firms are willing to
spend hundreds of millions to increase the speed of their operations by a few mil-
liseconds through the installation of fiber cables in the ocean or purchasing other
related IT infrastructure, [Philips, 2012].
The remarkable surge of HFT in recent years was investigated to assess whether
and to what extent such practices can provide liquidity to slow and more tradi-
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tional financial operators, alter the volatility of the market, [Biais et al., 2014] or
contribute to the destabilization of the regular functioning of exchanges in some
specific instances, [Easley et al., 2011].
Clearly, there are issues worth investigating for the policy maker: HFT may im-
prove the liquidity in the market, as the order book is flooded with thousands of
bids or asks. In particular, while market orders consume liquidity, plenty of limit
orders are typically interpreted as a way to provide liquidity or a way to manage
trading akin to what an ordinary market-maker would do. However, it was insight-
fully pointed out by [Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009, Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013] that the
picture is more blurred: a limit order certainly offers an option to trade to othes but,
if this opportunity is (only) available for a fraction of a second, it may be difficult
for the “ordinary” trader to use it and, indeed, the triggered order may reach the
market too late or generate other unexpected and potentially negative effects. More-
over, HFT may generate intermittent volume and suddenly reduce the number or
orders that are posted, thus enlarging the spread and failing to be reliable source of
liquidity.
In this paper we describe a stylized model of HFT in which a set of agents want to
buy or sell a single stock in a trading session. This can be done submitting limit or-
ders, with no certain execution, or marketable orders that instead immediately hit the
opposite side of the book and are executed at less advantageous prices. Every trader
maximizes his expected profits and must decide the limit price for a single unit of the
stocks. We assume that the limit price is a simple linear combination of the outstand-
ing best aks and bid at the time of submission, as in [Ladley and Pellizzari, 2014].
HFT is included in the model allowing some traders to cancel and resubmit mul-
tiple times during a trading session: in contrast to the ordinary agent, who can send
an order only once, the fast trader will have f additional chances to cancel the previ-
ous order (if it was lying in the book unexecuted) and revise the submission posting
a fresh quote or a market order. Clearly, this permits to exploit orders that appeared
after the first submission or, say, to change the degree of aggressiveness of the order
with the conditions of the market. The value of f spans the speed of the traders and
while ordinary, slow traders have f = 0 (no further chance beyond the unique one
granted to everyone in the session), larger values of f are meant to model various
intensities of the high frequency attribute.
We are mainly interested in quantifying the efficiency, if any, that the HF traders
would bring with respect to the same market with slow agents. As a second target
we aim at describing the way profits from trading are distributed among traders,
when a fraction of the agents are engaged in HFT and with a special concern for the
(differential) effects on the remaining slow traders.
In the next Section, we present the model describing the agents, the order book
and how strategies are learned. Section 3 uses simulations to show results related
to the efficiency of the market with/without HFT and how profits from trading are
shared. Finally, we close with some additional remarks.
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2 The model
2.1 The traders
We consider a standard Continuous Double Auction (CDA) where at each time
step a single trader enters the market. An equal number N of buyers and sell-
ers are endowed with a positive reservation value vi, i = 1, ...,N or positive cost
ci, i = N+ 1, ...,2N. In every trading session they can buy or sell a single unit of
stock and, if a transaction occurs at a price p, the profit pii awarded to the agent
is vi − p or p− ci, respectively. As no profit is made in the lack of a trade, i.e.,
pi = 0, traders have the obvious incentive to exchange their unit, bidding (asking)
less (more) than the value (cost) they are endowed with. Scholars have discussed
other mechanisms to model trading: in [Rosu, 2009], traders are equipped with a
discount rate that penalizes delayed or missed trading differently, allowing to de-
fine sets of patient or impatient traders. We prefer to use private values and costs
because an equilibrium price is easily computed and still impatience is immediately
and intuitively related to the magnitude of values and costs. In fact, buyers with high
values or sellers with low costs suffer large losses if they do not trade and can be
thought as impatient traders; conversely, buyers/sellers with values and costs close
to the equilibrium price can generally obtain small gains and are nearly indifferent
between trading and non-trading, hence resembling patient traders.
We deal with cancellation in a simplified and non-strategic way: at the end of
every time step each order stored in the book is cancelled1 with (a small) exogenous
probability Pc > 0 that is independent of time, state of the book and of the specific
agent acting in that period. This is the only source of cancellation for traders whose
fi = 0. Fast traders with fi > 0 can have their order exogenously canceled as just
described or intentionally cancel (and resubmit) their order up to f times after the
first submission, if they have not traded yet.
2.2 The book
At any time t the book is a double sequence of outstanding unit orders
St = {0≤ ...≤ b3t ≤ b2t ≤ b1t < a1t ≤ a2t ≤ a3t ≤ ...},
where b1t ,b2t , ... and a1t ,a2t , ... are the lists of buy and sell orders in the books. We
often omit the time index for simplicity. The highest bid b1 and lowest ask a1 are
referred as best bid and best ask, respectively.
Traders submit a single order when they enter the market in a random period,
according to the rules mentioned in the previous subsection. As the quantity is fixed
1 We never cancel the order in the time step in which it is submitted.
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at one unit, the trader must decide the limit price that is computed using a function
of the state of the book and his valuation/cost.
The submission of an (unit) order with limit price l changes the book and results
in an immediate trade, a marketable order, if the bid (ask) is greater (smaller) than
or equal to the best ask (bid). In this case, the two agents involved in the transaction
get the associated profits and the book is then updated, changing one between the
best bid or ask. If instead the new order is not marketable, it is inserted in the book,
maintaining its ordering, to be possibly used in future trades. Any profit occurring
after the time of submission t is accrued in the same way to the parties involved
whenever a transaction takes place.
2.3 The strategy
In real markets, traders can decide the time at which to submit and the limit price l
they want to use (in our model the quantity is fixed at one). The time of first submis-
sion is random and drawn independently from any other variable of the model. We
further assume, as in [Ladley and Pellizzari, 2014, Pellizzari, 2011], that each agent
develops his own trading strategy picking the limit price using the relation
lit = αia1t +βib1t + γi, (1)
where αi,βi and γi are individual constant to be found maximizing expected profits
and a1t ,b1t are the best ask and bid at the time t in which the order is issued. Agents
for which fi > 0 have multiple chances to cancel the orders: in more detail, in f
random periods after the first submission, they can cancel their unexecuted order and
resubmit at different limit prices (that are computed using (1) with the outstanding
best bid and ask at the time of resubmission).
In other words, the model assumes that HFT really is only a matter of how of-
ten one can cancel the order, reevaluate his/her limit price and resubmit the order.
We are aware that this simple approach has limitations and real HF traders may be
more sophisticated in several ways. However, it is clear that having the chance to
cancel and resubmit at high frequency should give an edge to some traders who
can, say, wait-and-see for better market conditions or have a much higher chance to
selectively pick the most beneficial quotes left on the book for some time.
The constants αi,βi and γi in (1) are individually tuned using a Evolution Strate-
gies (ES) numerical scheme to maximize expected profit (hence, many sessions are
averaged and as a consequence we also smooth the effect of the random position
in the submission queue). The ES method belongs to the family of evolutionary
algorithms and superficially resembles the well known Genetic Algorithms but re-
quires no binary-coding or discretization of αi,βi,γi and has self-adapting meta-
parameters that can be used to gauge whether convergence has been reached, see
[Beyer and Schwefel, 2002] for an overview.
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Technically speaking, maximization of profits is jointly performed by all the
traders and ES determine a numerical equilibrium in which no agent has further
incentive to alter his/her constants. In such a sense, the outcome is (just) one of the
multiple trading equilibria that can appear given the values of vi,ci, fi. We do not in-
vestigate here the number and properties of different equilibria and are content with
the observation that, whatever they are, the selected triples αi,βi,γi form a stable
configuration that is learnable as proved by the fact that is was indeed built by the
ES optimizing procedure, that can be thought as a learning device in which traders
(and their strategies) compete as in the marketplace.
3 Results
3.1 Implementation and parameters
We simulated the model described in the previous section using N = 120, effectively
allowing 240 traders to participate in every trading session. To assess the variabil-
ity inherent in any simulation, we have run 20 independent simulations in which
5000 trading sessions take place. Expected profits are computed averaging 100 trad-
ing sessions, after which ES performs selection, recombination and the so-called
s-mutation (for meta-parameters) and y-mutation (for trading strategies).
All the results are based on the average of 20 simulations, in which we keep the
last trading session (out of the 5000 that were used to “train” the traders towards
optimal extraction of profits). Values and costs are symmetric around 10, which is
therefore the theoretical equilibrium price and cancelation probability Pc is set at
0.01.
We performed 5 experiments to investigate how HFT affects efficiency and the
way profits are apportioned among traders. Table 1 describes our design in which,
starting from a benchmark case of slow traders alone ( f = 0), we progressively
add sets of HF traders ( f = 3) with different values and costs. It is convenient in
the following to label agents according to their values and costs: in particular, we
nickname marginal agents whose value or cost is 10 as calm, referring to the fact
that they have nothing to loose if they fail to trade at the equilibrium price; using the
same intuition, buyers or sellers with v= 14 or c= 6 are nervous, as they feel more
the need to trade; finally, when values reach 18 and costs as are low as 2, traders
are named as hysteric, to capture the fear for sizeable losses in case of no trade. We
remark that the terms calm, nervous and hysteric are related to personal values and
costs and have nothing to do with the high frequency feature that depends on f .
Figure 1 shows the allocative efficiency reached in the experiments. Observe that
when no HFT is present, agents nevertheless learn to extract 95% of the trading sur-
plus (median value over 20 simulations). As more HF traders are added, efficiency
increases reaching a median value of 100% in Experiment 3, in which some hys-
teric traders use HFT. The effect is smaller if calm or nervous HFT is included in
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HFT Buyers’ values vi Sellers’ costs ci
Benchmark 0 18 14 10 18 14 10 2 6 10 2 6 10
Experim. 1 40 18 14 10 18 14 10* 2 6 10 2 6 10*
Experim. 2 40 18 14 10 18 14* 10 2 6 10 2 6* 10
Experim. 3 40 18 14 10 18* 14 10 2 6 10 2* 6 10
Experim. 4 120 18 14 10 18* 14* 10* 2 6 10 2* 6* 10*
Table 1 Description of the 5 experiments. The first row describes the benchmark case with no
HFT and each listed value/cost represents a set of 20 traders. Groups of HF traders are boldfaced
and starred and, for instance, in Experiment 3 there are 20 hysteric HF buyers (sellers) with value
(cost) equal to 18 (2).
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Fig. 1 Efficiency of the markets in the simulation experiments.
the market and the same can be said for Experiment 4 when HF traders belong to all
types (calm, nervous and hysteric), thus proving that a large portion of HFT results
in a negligible efficiency supplement with respect to the benchmark case.
Efficiency is a global measure of the ability of traders to transact when it is conve-
nient given the individual valuations and the equilibrium price driven by the demand
and supply for the asset. However, it says nothing about the precise way in which the
available surplus is shared among traders. Table 2 shows how profits are distributed
in our experiments. The profits of the first row, relative to the benchmark, are used
to normalize the entries of the other rows and cases where HF traders are in action
are boldfaced.
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In Experiment 1, we see the effect the introduction of calm HF traders. With
respect to the benchmark case, the average profit of all calm traders increase by
38% mainly at the expenses of the nervous agents who see their profits reduced by
6%.
When HFT is unleashed for some nervous traders (Experiment 2), they see their
own profit increase by 8%, slashing by 35% the share of the calm agents.
Calm Nervous Hysteric
Benchmark 1.00 1.00 1.00
Experim. 1 1.38 0.94 0.99
Experim. 2 0.65 1.08 1.01
Experim. 3 0.76 0.96 1.10
Experim. 4 0.18 0.98 1.02
Table 2 Fractions of profit gained by calm, nervous and hysteric traders when HFT enters the
market. All figures are normalized with respect to the benchmark case with no HFT.
The most pronounced effect can be seen in Experiment 3 when hysteric HFT
enters the market. The profit of all hysteric traders, slow and fast, increase overall
by 10%, with reductions ranging from 4 to 24% for all other market’s participants.
At least two things are worth noticing: firstly, adoption of HFT increases the
profits of the agents that use this trading approach. Effects are relatively large for
calm traders (+38%), even though the absolute magnitude of the variation is small
(being traders’ valuations equal to the equilibrium price), and are smaller but still
sizeable in absolute terms for hysteric traders. Secondly and quite remarkably, if
HFT is used by one subgroup alone, negative effects on profits are detectable for all
other traders.
In a nutshell, HFT benefits the ones who use it but damages the other agents
that are worse off, despite the increment of the efficiency that was shown in Figure
1. If the model realistically depicts the market, traders may increasingly be pushed
to employ HFT, producing the outcomes shown in “Experiment 4”. In this case, in
which agents equally split between slow and HFT, the profits of the calm traders are
nearly wiped out (-82%), whereas nervous agents experience some losses (-2%) and
hysteric traders keep some gains (+2%).
4 Discussion
In this paper, we present a simple model of HFT where some traders have in every
trading session f > 0 additional chances to cancel and resubmit not yet unexecuted
orders. The higher f , the more frequently traders can adjust their orders, if needed,
and exploit transitory opportunities in the book. In contrast, traditional (i.e., slow)
traders have a single chance to deposit an order per trading session, with no possi-
bility to alter it.
8 Paolo Pellizzari
Despite the simplicity of the model, we obtain two main insights: the introduction
of HFT marginally increases the market efficiency and, hence, the surplus extracted
is larger than in the presence of slow traders alone. In this sense, the pie gets slightly
bigger as efficiency steps up from 95 in the benchmark case to 98% or more when
few HF traders are introduced. We also find that HFT benefits the investors who are
using it at the expenses of other traditional investors that have their profits eroded
significantly or slashed.
In [Bernales, 2014] it is claimed that algorithmic traders with a trading speed
advantage only reduce global welfare and this statement is to some extent at odd
with our first finding. We instead strongly corroborate, in our agent-based setup,
Bernales’ result that HFT de facto predates non-HFT agents, seizing a portion of
their theoretical gains. One novel insight of our model follows the observation that,
under the dynamics that we have just described, many traders would be tempted to
invest in IT infrastructure and actually jump in the HFT arena. If this be the case,
however, efficiency would drop almost to the levels of the benchmark, as shown in
the last row of Table 2. Hence, when too many HF traders operate in the market,
their profit would shrink again as if few were present. In a situation resembling a
“prisoner dilemma”, policymakers may attempt to regulate access to and activities
of HFT firms, to curb arms races potentially able to waste costly private investments
and hamper public welfare.
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